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According to a number of influential views in penal theory,1 one of the 
primary goals of the criminal justice system is to rehabilitate offenders. Rehabilitative 
measures are commonly included as a part of a criminal sentence. For example, in 
some jurisdictions judges may order violent offenders to attend anger management 
classes or to undergo cognitive behavioural therapy as a part of their sentences. In a 
limited number of cases, neurointerventions—interventions that exert a direct 
biological effect on the brain—have been used as aids to rehabilitation, typically 
being imposed as part of criminal sentences, separate treatment orders, or conditions 
of parole. Examples of such interventions include medications intended to attenuate 
addictive desires in substance-abusing offenders2 and agents intended to suppress 
libido in sex offenders.  
This chapter reviews some of the ethical issues raised by the use of 
neurointerventions as aids to rehabilitation. It focuses specifically on cases in which 
the neurointerventions are administered to criminal offenders, in response to the 
                                                 
1
A number of theorists who advocate consequentialist views on punishment have claimed that 
punishment should contribute to the rehabilitation of the offender. See, for example, (Bentham, 1890; 
Carlen, 1989; Cullen, 1982). However, this claim is also supported by certain non-consequentialist views. 
For example, see (Hampton, 1984; Morris, 1981). 
2 For example, in the United Kingdom, methadone treatments have been imposed by the courts as part 
of Drug Treatment and Testing Orders. See (Eley et al., 2002; Hough et al., 2003) 
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commission of a particular crime, and under the provisions of the criminal law. We 
will refer to neurointerventions intended to aid rehabilitation as ‘neurocorrectives’ 
when they are used in this way. We will have nothing to say about the use of 
neurointerventions as aids to offender rehabilitation within the context of ordinary 
medical or psychiatric care.  
 Whilst the use of neurocorrectives is currently rare, there are good reasons to 
take seriously the possibility that it might, in the future, become more prevalent. 
Recent developments in behavioural and social neuroscience suggest that we may 
soon have at our disposal a far wider range of neurointerventions capable of 
facilitating rehabilitation in some  criminal offenders. For instance, recent research 
has suggested that pharmacological agents could be used to affect certain traits that 
are linked to criminal behaviour, such as aggression, impulsivity, and the willingness 
to inflict harm on others (Bond, 2005; Crockett et al., 2013, 2010, 2008; Donovan et 
al., 2000; Khanzode et al., 2006; Nevels et al., 2010). It is also possible that deep 
brain stimulation (Lu et al., 2009), transcranial magnetic stimulation (Young et al., 
2010), and neuro-feedback (Sitaram et al., 2009) could be used in similar ways.  
Whilst such neurointerventions could potentially provide powerful new means 
of facilitating rehabilitation, it might be argued that they raise ethical problems that 
more traditional criminal justice interventions do not, and it is these problems that 
provide the impetus for this review.  Briefly, one of the main problems is that 
neurocorrectives constitute a form of medical intervention, and it is a standard tenet of 
medical ethics that it is it is permissible to perform a medical intervention on a 
competent individual only if that individual has given his informed consent to that 
intervention. However, as we shall see, it is not clear whether it is possible to obtain 
valid consent to such an intervention from an incarcerated individual. On the other 
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hand, it is also unclear whether the requirements for informed consent are the same in 
criminal offenders as in other populations; it is often thought permissible to override 
the wishes of criminal offenders in ways in which it would not be permissible to 
override the wishes of non-offenders, and penal theory furnishes a number of 
candidate justifications for this view. The use of neurocorrectives in criminal justice 
thus raises problems that lie at the intersection of medical ethics and penal theory. 
Before beginning to outline these problems in more detail, it is necessary to 
highlight a distinction that has important ramifications for the ethical debate regarding 
the use of neurocorrectives. The distinction pertains to the extent to which offenders 
have a choice about whether to undergo the neurocorrective. On the one hand, the 
neurocorrective might be imposed as a condition of parole or early release from 
prison. In such a scenario, the offender would essentially be given the option to either 
agree to undergo the neurocorrective and serve less time in prison, or to refuse to 
undergo the neurocorrective and serve his original prison term. To date, this is the 
most common way in which neurocorrectives have been used.  
On the other hand, a neurocorrective might be imposed as a mandatory part of 
a criminal sentence; in such a scenario, the offender would not be able to avoid 
undergoing the neurocorrective. Although uncommon, there is some precedent for 
this sort of use; for example, androgen deprivation therapy is mandated as a part of 
the criminal sentence of certain sexual offenders in Florida.3  
With this distinction in mind, we shall begin, in section I, by assessing two 
ethical objections to what we will call ‘the neurocorrective offer’: the offer of a choice 
between (i) undergoing a neurocorrective and receiving a reduced prison term, or (ii) 
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 For discussion, see del Busto and Harlow (2011); Douglas et al. (2013), p. 396. 
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receiving the normal prison term without any requirement to undergo the 
neurocorrective. In assessing these objections, we will assume that the circumstances 
in which the neurocorrective offer is made are not coercive, or not coercive in a 
manner that would invalidate the offender’s consent. In Section II, we shall consider 
an objection that challenges this assumption, and that many have taken to be the most 
powerful objection to the neurocorrective offer. Finally in section III, we shall 
examine attempts to respond to this objection by denying that the offender’s valid 
consent is required for the morally permissible use of neurocorrectives. We also 
consider the implications of such a denial for the moral permissibility of making 
neurocorrectives a mandatory part of criminal sentences.4 
 
I Non Consent-Based Objections to the Neurocorrective Offer 
 
 




 It might be argued that making the neurocorrective offer would be the first step 
on a slippery slope to the future use of neurocorrectives in more problematic ways. It 
is possible to distinguish two different ‘slippery slopes’ that might be invoked. First, it 
might be claimed that even if it would be morally permissible for the state to give 
offenders the option of undergoing a neurocorrective in return for a reduced sentence, 
                                                 
4 It should be acknowledged that in some US states the chemical castration of sex offenders is 
‘mandated’ not only in the sense that the law makes such interventions compulsory for these offenders, 
but also in the sense that the law does not allow judges discretion to exclude chemical castration from the 
sentence (California Penal Code, 2012, 645(b)) . In some statutes, the mandatory use of chemical 
castration is contingent upon a determination by a court appointed medical expert that the offender is an 
appropriate candidate for such an intervention (Florida Statutes Annotated, 2013, §794.0235; Louisiana 
Revised Statutes, 2013, §14:43.6A).Whilst this practice raises other important moral issues, we shall not 
consider them in this chapter. 
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this can be expected to lead to a situation in which the state begins to impose 
neurocorrectives as a mandatory part of criminal sentences. Second, it might be 
claimed that offering neurocorrectives that are safe and effective in facilitating 
rehabilitation can be expected to lead to unsafe or ineffective neurointerventions also 
being offered. The worry here is that the neurocorrective offer might be made to 
certain offenders even though the neurointervention in question would either not aid 
their rehabilitation, or would pose excessive risks.5  
 The persuasiveness of any slippery slope argument depends in part upon the 
warrant that one has for claiming that the predicted bad outcome can be expected to 
occur once one has taken the first step on the putative slippery slope. In the arguments 
that we are considering here, we must assess the reasons that we have for believing 
that the predicted bad outcomes mentioned above could be expected to follow from 
making the neurocorrective offer.  
 In relation to the first slippery slope argument—the putative slippery slope to 
the mandatory imposition of neurocorrectives—it seems that there is little warrant for 
such a belief. To see why, it is illuminating to consider the fact that those who press 
this slippery slope argument as the sole basis for rejecting the neurocorrective offer 
believe that the neurocorrective offer considered in itself would be morally 
permissible. The reason that they object to it is that they believe that making the 
neurocorrective offer would lead subsequently to the mandatory use of 
neurocorrectives in criminal justice. They thus draw an important moral distinction 
between the neurocorrective offer and mandatory imposition of neurocorrectives 
regarding the former as permissible in itself while the latter is not.  
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 This objection has been raised in relation to the use of chemical castration as a criminal remedy (Lewis, 
1953, p. 229; Tancredi and Weisstub, 1986).  
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 It seems that the most plausible way to defend this moral distinction is to appeal 
to the moral significance of the offender’s consent; in the case of the neurocorrective 
offer, an offender’s undergoing a neurocorrective would be consensual, whilst in the 
latter case it would be non-consensual. This is a morally significant difference; in 
obtaining an agent’s valid consent to some intervention, we are respecting their 
autonomous choice.6 
 Yet, if those who press this slippery slope objection appeal to the moral 
significance of consent in order to justify their initial claim that the neurocorrective 
offer is not morally problematic in itself, then their objection loses its force. If there is 
a morally significant difference between consensual and involuntary uses of 
neurocorrectives, then it is unclear why the former should lead to the latter.7 Indeed, 
there is a clear and plausible moral principle that could be invoked against any such 
move, namely: 
 
 The Consent Requirement: The provision of neurocorrectives to criminal offenders 
would be impermissible without the valid consent of 
the offender.8  
 
The consent requirement seems to provide us with a non-arbitrary moral principle that 
can allow us to clearly and consistently permit the neurocorrective offer whilst 
forbidding the mandatory imposition of neurocorrectives. Moreover, it is a principle 
that is in fact likely to be invoked, since it has the backing of a rich philosophical and 
                                                 
6
 In turn, the principle of respect for autonomy, which finds its roots in the philosophy of both Kant and 
Mill, is a cornerstone of liberal thought, as well as modern biomedical ethics. See Kant (2004); Mill 
(1991) See also Beauchamp and Childress (2001) . 
7
 See Douglas (2010) for a related general objection to a class of slippery slope arguments. 
8
 For discussion, see (Douglas, 2014, p. 107). 
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political tradition. This, however, is not to say that it ought to be invoked. In section 
III, we shall suggest that there may be ways of challenging the consent requirement.9  
 It might be objected, at this point, that the existence of a clear and principled 
ground for distinguishing two practices is not always enough to prevent a slippery 
slope from one to the other. In some contexts where slippery slope arguments are 
invoked, there is a fear that some morally acceptable practice might ultimately lead to 
a morally unacceptable practice because the difference between the acceptable and the 
unacceptable practice is merely one of degree. This raises the possibility that 
acceptance of the unacceptable practice might be made by a series of small steps, 
none of which will be significant enough to draw attention. Thus, though there is a 
moral difference between the two practices, this difference is not likely to attract 
sufficient attention to prevent the slide. However, in the case that we are considering 
here, the difference between offering a reduced prison term in return for agreement to 
undergo a neurocorrective and mandating a neurocorrective is a clear and qualitative 
difference, so it is difficult to see why such a transition should be expected to escape 
notice.  
 Consider now the second slippery slope argument, according to which offering 
safe and effective neurocorrectives is likely to lead ultimately to the offering of unsafe 
or ineffective neurocorrectives. Given that the difference between a safe and effective 
intervention and an unsafe or ineffective one is often only a matter of degree (for 
example, it may consist in a difference in the dose of a drug), there is a possibility that 
the latter would be introduced by a series of small steps. There is also historical 
evidence that might be adduced in support of this argument: humanity has a 
                                                 
9 Notice though that if the consent requirement can be challenged in this context, then, in the absence of 
another explanation, this may put pressure on the claim that the use of mandatory neurocorrectives 
would be an outcome that we have moral reason to avoid. 
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disturbing track record of erroneously assuming the safety and effectiveness of 
purported neurotechnological ‘solutions’ to criminality, with psychosurgery being 
only the most notorious example (Greely, 2008). 
These considerations suggest that the slippery slope argument adverting to the risk 
that neurointerventions will be used when unsafe or ineffective should be taken 
seriously. However, it should be noted that this argument cannot be fully assessed 
until we have a clear empirical understanding of the ways in which the use of 
neurocorrectives could be monitored, and the likely success of these techniques in 
preventing unsafe or ineffective use. This is something we do not currently have.  
 
 
ii) Neuro-Interventions Would Not Achieve The Objectives Of Criminal 
Justice 
 
One of the main justifications for using neurocorrectives is that they promise to be 
highly effective in facilitating offender rehabilitation. 10 However, whilst 
rehabilitation might plausibly be claimed to be a central aim of the criminal justice 
system, it might be argued that the criminal justice system also has deterrent and 
retributive objectives. If this is right, then one might worry that even if the use of 
neurocorrectives might allow the criminal justice system to be more effective in 
facilitating rehabilitation, the use of such interventions may fail to achieve, or perhaps 
even run contrary to, the deterrent and retributive objectives of criminal justice.  
                                                 
10
 Whilst it is uncontroversial that neurointerventions could be effective in rehabilitating offenders in the 
superficial sense that the offenders will become less disposed to commit criminal offences, Vincent has 
argued that they may be unable to rehabilitate offenders into more responsible agents, since the way in 
which such interventions restore certain mental capacities might adversely affect other factors that 
undergird responsible agency such as authenticity and personal identity. See Vincent (2014). 
9 
 One way to argue that neurocorrectives would fail to achieve the deterrent and 
retributive objectives of criminal justice is to claim that they would cause insufficient 
suffering. 11 In order for an intervention to achieve the retributive and deterrent aims 
of criminal justice, that intervention must inflict a certain degree of suffering. It might 
be feared that neurocorrectives—especially those with few side-effects—would not 
inflict sufficient suffering to deter criminal offending by others. Furthermore, since 
retributivists believe that retribution requires punishing offenders in proportion to 
their desert, some (although, as we shall explain below, not all) retributivists might 
claim that neurocorrectives would fail to inflict enough suffering to adequately 
achieve the retributive objective of criminal punishment.  
One problem with this objection is that it could arguably be avoided by 
purposely developing neurocorrectives that have, and are intended to have, serious 
negative side-effects; interventions with such effects would most appropriately be 
conceived as alternative punishments, rather than alternatives to punishment.12 In 
response, though, it might be argued that there is something specific about the kind of 
suffering inflicted by incarceration that makes it suited to realizing the deterrent or 
retributive goals of criminal justice.13 Yet, it is not clear that this is the case; as 
Ryberg points out, “several retributivists accept that punishment need not consist only 
in imprisonment or fines” and can instead include sanctions such as “home detention, 
community service, and electronic monitoring” (Ryberg, 2012, p. 240).14  
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 This is an objection that has been advanced by a US court against the use of chemical castration as a 
criminal remedy (Idaho Court of Appeals, 1991, 120 Idaho 953, 821 P.2d 1008 ).  
12
 Jesper Ryberg develops this point in Ryberg (2012), pp. 239-240. 
13
 Though see, for a response to this suggestion, Ryberg (2012). 
14
 It might be argued that, intuitively, it would be impermissible to impose neurocorrectives for their 
negative side-effects. However, if this is so, and if Ryberg is correct to think that the permissibility of 
doing so is consistent with retributivism, it may be that the appropriate response is to reject retributivism. 
This would in turn undercut the objection that neurointerventions are insufficiently retributive.    
10 
Furthermore, even if incarceration were particularly well suited to achieving the 
retributive and deterrent objectives of criminal justice, concerns about insufficient 
retribution and deterrence would at most constitute a decisive objection to the use of 
neurocorrectives as the sole response to criminal offending. They would not militate 
against the use of neuro-interventions alongside traditional punishments. Indeed, there 
might be certain advantages in using neurocorrectives to realise the rehabilitative 
goals of criminal justice while traditional punishments remedies are used to deter 
criminal behaviour and mete out deserved suffering; separating rehabilitation from 
retribution and deterrence might allow these elements to be more closely tailored to 
the circumstances in a particular case.  
As Ryberg notes, the above concerns regarding neurocorrectives causing 
insufficient suffering only raise problems for so-called ‘positive retributivists’ 
(Ryberg, 2012, p. 239). Whilst both positive and negative retributivists claim that it is 
morally unacceptable to punish offenders more severely than they deserve, those who 
endorse positive retributivism also make the further claim that it is morally 
unacceptable to punish offenders less severely than they deserve. It is this latter 
requirement that was invoked above. However, the requirement that offenders not be 
punished more severely than they deserve might also be thought to ground an 
objection to the use of neurocorrectives. Both negative and positive retributivists 
might object to the use of neurocorrectives on the basis that they would inflict more 
suffering than the offender deserves.  
How are we to ascertain the degree of suffering that it would be excessive to 
impose on an offender? Of course, much will depend on the particular offence in 
question. However, one useful general comparison that can be made here is to the 
degree of suffering involved in incarceration. If retributivists accept the assumption 
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that the state may permissibly subject some criminal offenders to incarceration, then 
they cannot consistently claim that neurocorrectives involving suffering no more 
severe than that involved in incarceration constitute excessive punishment. Indeed, it 
seems that the restrictions of movement and association entailed by incarceration 
reliably cause significant suffering. They frequently damage existing personal 
relationships whilst making it difficult to form new ones, they seriously restrict sexual 
and reproductive freedoms, they make it impossible to pursue most careers, and they 
generally prevent the realisation of many life-plans (Douglas, 2014, pp. 113–115). 
Yet retributivists often believe that prolonged incarceration is a punishment that is 
proportionate to desert in the case of certain offenders. 
This suggests that one could not consistently object to the administration of all 
neurocorrectives on the grounds that they would inflict excessive suffering, for many 
neurocorrectives would cause less suffering than incarceration. For instance, it seems 
plausible to suppose that the negative side-effects of many psychopharmaceuticals 
would be comparable in their quality, frequency and severity to those of existing 
routinely used mind-active drugs such as fluoxetine (Prozac) and citalopram. Those 
effects typically cause much less suffering than the effects of incarceration outlined 
above.  
To these side-effects we also, of course, need to add the intended effects of the 
neurocorrective, which may also cause a degree of suffering. For example, we can 
imagine that an aggression-lowering drug would cause suffering to an individual to 
the extent that the individual enjoys and wishes to retain the aggressive urges that the 
drug attenuates. However, there seems no reason to suppose that the intended effects 
of all neurocorrectives would involve substantial suffering. Consider a drug that 
attenuates only the most extreme impulses towards violent aggression, and suppose 
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that it is imposed on an offender who dislikes and reflectively rejects those violent 
impulses. Such a drug could be expected to cause significantly less suffering than 
incarceration. As such, it is not clear that a sentence that involved the use of 
neurocorrectives would suffering that is disproportionate to desert in all cases. 
We shall return to the question of the suffering that neurocorrectives cause, and 
how they compare to the suffering caused by incarceration, in section III. To conclude 
our discussion of this objection though, it is worth noting that even if certain 
neurocorrectives on offer to offenders might cause suffering that could appropriately 
be deemed excessive, we are considering this objection on the assumption that the 
offender could autonomously choose to reject the neurocorrective offer. Indeed, if we 
believe that the criminal justice system should respect criminal offenders as rational 
self-governing agents,15 then we might plausibly claim that competent offenders 
should be free to make their own informed decision about whether the suffering that a 
certain neurocorrective might cause outweigh the benefits of a reduced prison 
sentence.   
 
II Consent-Based Objections to the Neurocorrective Offer 
 
In the previous section, we suggested that one reason why imposing 
neurointerventions as a mandatory part of a criminal sentence might be deemed more 
problematic than making the neurocorrective offer is that the latter approach would 
allow the offender to consent to the use of a neurocorrective, whereas the former 
would not. Furthermore, we suggested that one of the primary reasons that consent is 
deemed to be morally significant is that, in obtaining an agent’s valid consent to some 
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 See Murphy (1973) for a defence of this claim. 
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intervention, we respect the agent’s autonomy. In turn, we may understand autonomy 
to refer to an agent’s capacity for self-determination or self-government. Autonomy is 
one of the central values in contemporary medical ethics; however, it is a highly 
contested phenomenon and admits of numerous interpretations that we lack the space 
to survey here.16  For our purposes, though, we may understand an agent to be 
autonomous to the extent that they are able to make decisions about what to do in 
accordance with their own desires and values, and in the absence of external 
controlling influences. 
 In medical ethics, it is often claimed that in order for an individual’s consent 
to be valid (and reflective of autonomous choice), it must, amongst other things, be 
made in the absence of coercion (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001; Faden and 
Beauchamp, 1986). In their influential account of informed consent in medical ethics, 
Beauchamp and Childress claim that coercion occurs “if and only if one person 
intentionally uses a credible and severe threat of harm or force to control another” 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2001, p. 94). One possible objection to the 
neurocorrective offer is that an offender could not validly consent to undergoing the 
neurocorrective because the offer is inherently coercive (Farah, 2002). This argument 
has commonly been raised against the practice of offering sex offenders chemical or 
physical castration in return for a reduced prison sentence, which we shall henceforth 
refer to as the ‘castration offer’.17 Since this offer is structurally similar to (and is 
indeed an instance of) the neurocorrective offer, it will be useful to consider the 
literature on the castration offer here. 
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 For some influential theories see Dworkin (1988) Christman (1991); Ekstrom (1993). For a useful 
overview, see (Taylor, 2005) 
17
 See European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (2009); Green, (1986); McMillan, (2014a); Scott and Holmberg (2003); Vanderzyl (1994).  
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Vanderzyl offers a clear statement of the objection under consideration in the 
following passage: 
 
. . . offering a convicted offender castration as an alternative to a lengthy prison 
sentence constitutes an inherently coercive practice rendering truly voluntary consent 
impossible (Vanderzyl, 1994, p. 140). 
 
Proponents of this sort of argument are not always clear about why this sort of offer 
involves coercion. However, one justification that is sometimes suggested is that the 
dire circumstances that offenders facing incarceration find themselves in means that 
they cannot be said to make a free choice when they choose to undergo the castration. 
For instance, Green claims that in such a scenario:  
 
Freedom of choice is impossible because the convict’s loss of liberty constitutes a 
deprivation of such a magnitude that he cannot choose freely and voluntarily, but he is 
forced to give consent to an alternative he would not otherwise have chosen (Green, 1986, 
pp. 16–17). 
 
McMillan suggests that another way in which the castration offer might be 
coercive is if the offer were made to an offender with the intention that the operant 
reason for the offender’s accepting the intervention would be the fact that the state 
will not release him if he refuses. Although the offer increases the range of options 
open to the sex offender, McMillan suggests that it may be understood to be coercive 
in so far as it “relies upon the undesirability of indefinite incarceration to coerce (the 
offender) into being castrated” (McMillan, 2014a, p. 587).  
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In this section, we shall consider two ways in which defenders of the 
neurocorrective offer might respond to the objection from coercion. The first response 
that we shall consider involves denying that the neurocorrective offer is coercive. One 
might begin to support such a denial by arguing that the explanations provided for 
why the neurocorrective offer is coercive are inadequate. For instance, many theorists 
have pointed out that one cannot claim that the offer is coercive simply by appealing 
to the offender’s loss of liberty, because not all deprivations of liberty entail that the 
choices made in such circumstances are coerced (Bomann-Larsen, 2013, p. 68; 
Rosati, 1994, p. 161; Ryberg, 2012, p. 236; Wertheimer and Miller, 2014). The 
following example is commonly used to illustrate this point: Suppose that a patient 
suffering from a terminal illness is offered a high-risk, but potentially life-saving 
experimental operation; intuitively, this patient could validly consent to this offer, 
even though she is making a choice between two unappealing alternatives from a 
position of severely restricted liberty. Ryberg and Petersen (2013) have also used this 
example to argue that McMillan’s appeal to the state’s intentions in making the 
castration offer cannot adequately explain why the offer is coercive; after all, a doctor 
who offered her patient the option of undergoing this operation might make the offer 
intending that the patient’s ‘operant reason’ for accepting it will be that he will die 
without it; yet, we do not seem to believe that this would make the offer coercive, as 
McMillan’s argument seems to imply. 
In response to this line of argument, defenders of the objection from coercion 
might seek to refine their analysis of why the neurocorrective offer is coercive so that 
their view is no longer subject to counter-examples of this sort. However there may be 
a more robust way of denying that the neurocorrective offer is coercive: one could 
16 
appeal to the conceptual claim that offers cannot, by their nature, be coercive. In the 
philosophical literature on coercion, it is often claimed that a necessary condition of 
coercion is that the coercer credibly threatens their victim (Nozick, 1969, p. 83; 
Stevens, 1988, p. 452) . Indeed, Beauchamp and Childress invoke this sort of 
condition in their understanding of coercion, delineated above. Since threats and 
offers are generally understood as mutually exclusive categories, this view supports 
Wertheimer and Miller’s claim that “genuine offers are inherently non-coercive and 
therefore cannot compromise consent qua coercion” (Wertheimer and Miller, 2014, p. 
592). 
If this is to be a satisfying reply to the objection from coercion, there will need to 
be a convincing account of the relevant difference between threats and offers that can 
explain why only the former can be coercive. There have been several different 
approaches to the distinction between threats and offers in the philosophical literature, 
and we lack the space to adequately explore them all here. 18 However, one account 
that has been particularly influential in this area that we shall briefly describe is the 
so-called ‘baseline’ approach. 
Both threats an offers announce an intention to bring about some outcome that is 
conditional on the recipient’s actions. According to the ‘baseline’ approach, threats 
and offers are to be distinguished by the relationship of the proposed outcome to the 
recipient’s baseline state of affairs, that is, how well off they would normally be in the 
absence of the proposal. Typically, threats announce a conditional intention to make 
the recipient worse off than the baseline state of affairs (think of a highway man who 
threatens to shoot you if you do not hand over your wallet), whilst offers do not; 
indeed, in some cases, offers announce an intention to make the recipient better off. 
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Theorists disagree about which baseline state of affairs should be relevant to our 
assessment of whether a proposal is a threat or an offer. On morally neutral baseline 
accounts, we might assess whether a proposal is an offer or a threat simply by 
considering whether it would make the recipient worse off than she would normally 
be.19 The problem with such accounts is that the recipient’s status quo situation might 
already include coercive elements. For instance, in his seminal essay on the topic of 
coercion, Nozick asks us to consider a slave owner who beats his slave each morning 
(for no reason connected to the slave’s behaviour), and who one day proposes to the 
slave that he will not to beat him on that day if he performs some task (Nozick, 1969, 
p. 450). Whilst the slave owner announces a conditional intention to make the slave 
better offer than he would normally be in the absence of the proposal, it nonetheless 
seems that the slave is being coerced here. 
Partly in order to account for why this sort of example involves coercion, theorists 
have developed moralized baseline accounts, according to which the baseline state of 
affairs that is relevant to our assessment of whether a proposal is a threat or an offer is 
understood to incorporate certain moral conditions. For instance, on Wertheimer’s 
moralized baseline account, a proposal amounts to a threat if the proposer announces 
the conditional intention to make the recipient worse off than the recipient ought to 
be, either by violating the recipient’s rights, or by failing to fulfil an obligation that 
the proposer has to the recipient. Such threats are coercive when the recipient has no 
reasonable choice but to comply with the proposal (Wertheimer, 2014). 
 Indeed, Wertheimer and Miller (2014) have invoked this account of coercive 
threats in defence of the claim that the castration offer is not coercive. On the 
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assumption that imposing the ordinary prison term would not violate the offender’s 
rights, offering the offender a choice between that ordinary term and a shorter prison 
term plus castration cannot be coercive on Wertheimer’s account, since it does not 
involve a threat to violate the offender’s rights if he does not comply. If the offender 
does not agree to undergo the castration, he will simply face the prison term to which 
he has made himself liable through his criminal conduct. A similar claim could be 
made with regards to other instances of the neurocorrective offer. 
However, it should be acknowledged that moralized baseline approaches to 
the distinction between threats and offers have been challenged on many counts. 20 
For instance (Feinberg, 1989, pp. 218–228) and Cohen (1977) have suggested that 
moralized baseline accounts are not always congruous with our intuitions, whilst 
Zimmerman (1981) has suggested that moralized baseline accounts do not link up in 
the right way with the underlying idea that coercion is wrong because it undermines 
freedom. 
 Furthermore, these writers have also objected to the fundamental claim that 
only threats can be coercive. For instance, Zimmerman claims that a proposal 
amounts to an offer if the recipient would prefer to move from his normally expected 
(i.e. morally neutral) pre-proposal situation to the proposal situation. However, he 
claims that offers (as well as threats) can be coercive if the recipient of the offer 
would strongly prefer to move from his actual pre-proposal situation to some 
alternative, feasible pre-proposal situation that the proposing party is preventing the 
recipient from being in (Zimmerman, 1981, p. 133). Meanwhile, Feinberg argues that 
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offers are coercive if the proposer only gives the recipient a choice between different 
evils, and if the ‘differential coercive pressure’ of the offer (that is the difference in 
the comparative worth of the projected consequences of the recipient’s refusing the 
offer, and the recipient’s accepting the offer) is sufficiently high (Feinberg, 1989, p. 
234). 
There is room for debate on the question of whether the neurocorrective offer 
would qualify as a coercive offer on these accounts. For it to do so on Zimmerman’s 
account, there would have to be a plausible sense in which the offender’s most 
preferred pre-proposal situation (in which she is not incarcerated) satisfies 
Zimmerman’s feasibility requirement. Similarly, on Feinberg’s account, there might 
be scope to question whether the differential coercive pressure of the neurocorrective 
offer is sufficiently high for the offer to qualify as coercive.  
Interestingly, Feinberg’s account of coercive offers might be understood to 
suggest a second line of response to the objection from coercion. Whilst Feinberg 
claims that certain offers can be coercive (as explained above), he also suggests that 
not all coercive offers invalidate consent. In particular, he suggests that coercive 
offers in which the proposing party had no role in creating the recipient’s pre-proposal 
circumstances of vulnerability very rarely invalidate consent (Feinberg, 1989, p. 246). 
He describes the following case as an example of a coercive offer that does not 
invalidate consent. Suppose that a woman has a daughter who is dying, but that she 
cannot afford to pay for surgery that would save her life. Suppose further that a 
millionaire, who is in no way responsible for the fact that the woman is poverty 
stricken, offers to pay for the child’s surgery if the mother agrees to have sex with 
him. According to Feinberg, the offer made by this ‘lecherous millionaire’ is coercive; 
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however, since the millionaire had no role in creating the woman’s pre-proposal 
circumstances of vulnerability, the mother could, on Feinberg’s view, nonetheless 
validly consent to the offer. 
Accordingly, a second response to the objection from coercion that defenders 
of the neuorcorrective offer could make is to argue that even if the offer is coercive, 
the offender’s consent to undergo the neurocorrective can nevertheless be valid. An 
initial problem with responding to the coercion-based objection to the neurocorrective 
offer in this way is that in order for an offer to be coercive without invalidating 
consent on Feinberg’s account, the proposing party must have played no role in 
creating the recipient’s pre-proposal circumstances of vulnerability. This condition is 
satisfied in Feinberg’s lecherous millionaire case: the millionaire did not contribute to 
the childhood medical condition in virtue of which the woman is vulnerable. By 
contrast, the neurocorrective offer does not meet this condition. It seems most natural 
to understand the state as the party that makes the offer in this case, and the state has a 
clear role in creating the offender’s pre-proposal circumstances of vulnerability: the 
state is responsible for incarcerating the offender, and the offender is in a position of 
vulnerability due to being incarcerated.  
Arguably though, one might circumvent this problem by weakening 
Feinberg’s conditions on consent-preserving coercive offers, so that a coercive offer 
could qualify as preserving the validity of the recipient’s consent if the proposing 
party did not violate the recipient’s rights in creating the recipient’s pre-proposal 
circumstances of vulnerability.    
However, even if this is a plausible move to make, we might question whether 
Feinberg gives a convincing argument for the claim that some coercive offers do not 
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invalidate consent. Moreover, even if such offers do not invalidate consent, one might 
wonder whether the neurocorrective offer could be wrong (i) because coercive, but 
not because its coerciveness invalidates consent, or (ii) for reasons other than its 
coerciveness. For instance, Bomann-Larsen (2013) has argued that although the 
neurocorrective offer is not coercive, the state, at least in some circumstances, may 
not be in the right normative position to make the offer; thus, in making the offer in 
these circumstances, the state may wrong the offender by failing to recognize him as a 
moral equal, and by violating his fundamental claim to moral respect.21 In a similar 
vein, McMillan has suggested, following Feinberg’s approach to coercion, that 
coercive offers that preserve consent can nonetheless cause the recipient “moral 
harm” (McMillan, 2014b, p. 596). Finally, Shaw endorses Bomann-Larsen’s criticism 
of the neurocorrective offer, but also objects to it on the consequence-based grounds 
that offering neurocorrectives to offenders would “send out the message that all 
offenders who are offered the intervention stand in need of it, whether they consent to 
it or not” (Shaw, 2014, p. 13).  
Clearly then, establishing that the neurocorrective offer does not preclude 
valid consent will not settle the debate regarding the moral permissibility of making 
the offer. However, it should be acknowledged that whilst the wrongs associated with 
exploitation, inappropriate offers and other moral harms may be significant, they are 
not readily understood as wrongs involving affronts to autonomy. As such, the 
responses that we have so far considered may be understood as ways in which 
defenders of the neurocorrective offer might seek to move the debate away from 
autonomy-based objections. This is a significant move, since affronts to autonomy are 
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often understood to be particularly egregious in contemporary bioethics, given the 
paramount value placed on autonomy in this context (Beauchamp and Childress, 
2001; Caplan, 2006, p. 117; Gillon, 2003).  
In any case, suppose, contrary to what we suggested above, that the 
neurocorrective offer is indeed coercive, and that it is therefore not possible for an 
offender to validly consent to it. In order to defend the moral permissibility of the 
neurocorrective offer on this understanding, one would then have to refute the consent 
requirement that we introduced in our discussion of the first slippery slope argument, 
according to which neurocorrectives can only permissibly be provided with the valid 
consent of the offender who will undergo the intervention. In the final section, we 
shall turn our attention to arguments that have been used in an attempt to refute the 
consent requirement. Of course, such arguments also lend support to the claim that the 
mandatory imposition of neurocorrectives could also be morally permissible 
III Denying the Need for Valid Consent 
 
One way to argue against the consent requirement is to claim that the moral 
reasons we have to respect the offender’s autonomy can be outweighed by other 
moral reasons. Whilst the value of autonomy plays a central role in medical ethics, 
there are a number of other moral values that are relevant to the penal context under 
consideration, including, inter alia, public welfare, liberty, justice and fairness. 
Indeed, it seems that these values can give rise to moral reasons to employ non-
consensual neurocorrectives.  
To illustrate, it seems plausible to claim that the state has strong reasons to 
employ neurocorrectives that are grounded in a concern for public welfare. These 
interventions could be highly effective at facilitating rehabilitation and preventing 
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recidivism, and might also be less costly than alternative means of realising these 
goals, such as incarceration. As well as protecting public welfare, one might also 
point out that neurocorrectives might benefit offenders themselves, either by allowing 
them to avoid more harmful corrective interventions, or because their rehabilitation is 
itself beneficial (Day et al., 2004, pp. 260–263; Ryberg, 2012, p. 232).  
Of course, these welfare-based arguments against the consent requirement 
would be met with strong opposition, in view of the importance attributed to the 
principle of respect for autonomy (as we briefly discussed above). There is some 
precedent within psychiatry and infectious disease control for the imposition of 
nonconsensual medical interventions on competent adults. However, at least in the 
UK, individuals have a legal right to refuse medical interventions (including 
neurointerventions) that precludes the lawful imposition of such interventions on 
public interest grounds.22 This might reflect a commitment to the view that, at least in 
relation to medical interventions, moral reasons to respect individual autonomy are 
more powerful than reasons to protect the public interest or the interests of the 
offender.  
In any case, it is, as Ryberg argues, too simplistic to set up the debate as one in 
which we simply weigh autonomy-related concerns against the welfare-based reasons 
to allow these interventions. Ryberg (2013) argues that our moral judgment regarding 
the permissibility of coerced treatments in criminal justice should also incorporate 
penal-theoretic considerations. For instance, he points out that retributivists are likely 
to be unconvinced by welfare-based arguments in favour of the use of 
neurocorrectives if such interventions result in a reduction in the severity of 
punishment, assuming that offenders currently receive proportionate punishment. 
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Having said this, if offenders currently receive punishment that is too severe, Ryberg 
suggests that there may yet be a retributivist argument in favour of using such 
interventions (Ryberg, 2013, pp. 10–11). These points are not intended to settle the 
debate about whether and when neurocorrectives may permissibly be used. Rather, 
the point is that the debate needs to be expanded to include penal-theoretic 
considerations.  
Another factor that complicates the moral assessment of the consent 
requirement is that, somewhat paradoxically, one might also raise an autonomy-based 
objection to the requirement. One of the main reasons that valid consent is deemed to 
be of such moral importance is rooted in the principle of respect for autonomy. In 
view of this, one might argue that valid consent is not required for the imposition of 
neurocorrectives on criminal offenders if those interventions can be understood as 
enabling autonomy. There may well be scope for understanding certain interventions 
as having these autonomy-enhancing effects. For instance, Arthur Caplan has 
suggested that the mandatory treatment of drug addicts may be justified on these 
grounds, since such addicts “do not have the full capacity to be self-determining or 
autonomous because their addiction literally coerces their behaviour” (Caplan, 2006, 
p. 118). Douglas et al. (2013) have suggested that similar considerations might count 
in favour of offering sex offenders the option to undergo chemical castration 
regardless of whether they could validly consent to it, since the desires that motivate 
many sexual offences (and that are attenuated by chemical castration) would qualify 
as impediments to autonomy on most plausible theories of autonomy.  
However, it is not clear that such considerations would be decisive; the claim 
that an individual’s future autonomy can permissibly be enhanced even at the cost of 
disrespecting his present autonomy would be controversial. Moreover, it is unlikely 
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that such an autonomy-based case for rejecting the consent requirement could be 
applicable to all criminal offenders (Douglas et al., 2013, pp. 400–410). The argument 
seems plausible with respect to cases in which the offender feels alienated from the 
impulsive desires that motivated his criminal act. However, whilst most theories of 
autonomy would claim that an offender would lack autonomy with respect to those 
desires, many offenders may not feel alienated from their desires in this way, and may 
instead endorse them. Most prominent theories of autonomy would claim that such 
offenders would be autonomous with respect to those desires. 
Alternatively, it might be possible to provide a paternalistic justification of 
non-consensual neurocorrectives, according to which it may be permissible to impose 
such an intervention by virtue of the fact that it is somehow in the offender’s own 
interests. The form of paternalism here is most naturally construed as a form of moral 
paternalism, according to which it is permissible to carry out paternalistic 
interventions on other agents in order to ensure their ‘moral well-being’. On this view, 
it might be argued that, by imposing a neurocorrective, we alter an offenders moral 
traits or dispositions, and the moral paternalist will hold that it can be 
noninstrumentally good to possess certain moral traits or dispositions.23 Thus, the 
moral paternalist might claim that, in imposing the neurocorrective, we benefit the 
offender in terms of their moral well-being. Indeed, according to the paternalistic 
theory of punishment defended by Herbert Morris, the justification of punishment is 
precisely to benefit the offender in this sort of way (Morris, 1981).   
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Of course, the strength of the moral paternalist’s argument here depends a 
great deal on the claim that a person’s welfare can be increased by changes in their 
moral traits and dispositions. In fact, the case of non-consensual neurocorrectives 
illustrates an important challenge to this view. It is likely that at least some criminal 
offenders would not endorse the changes in their moral traits and dispositions that 
neurocorrectives would bring about; yet, in the absence of endorsing these changes, it 
is difficult to see how the changes can be good for the offender. It seems that the 
moral paternalist can respond to this challenge in one of two ways; first, they may just 
bite the bullet and appeal to an objectivist account of welfare according to which there 
are certain goods that can improve a person’s life even if the person herself does not 
endorse having those goods. Alternatively, Dworkin suggests that we might appeal to 
a form of what he calls ‘legal moralism’, according to which it may be justifiable to 
try and make a person’s life go morally better per se, even if this does not make that 
person’s life go morally better for her in the way that moral paternalism seems to 
require (Dworkin, 2005, p. 319).     
 We have outlined some public welfare-based, autonomy-based, and 
paternalistic arguments in favour of imposing non-consensual neurocorrectives, and 
suggested that they all face significant challenges. Rather than objecting to the 
consent requirement by appealing to such arguments, one might alternatively argue 
that consistency demands that we permit the non-consensual use of neurocorrectives 
in criminal justice. It is generally believed that the state may permissibly do things to 
criminal offenders without their consent that it could not permissibly do to others 
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without (and in some cases with) consent (Douglas, 2014, p. 105). The challenge that 
this observation raises for those who defend the consent requirement is to give an 
account of the moral difference between incarcerating an offender without their 
consent and imposing a neurocorrective without their consent that can explain why 
the former is morally permissible, but the latter morally impermissible. 
One obvious difference is that neurocorrectives are likely to be physically 
invasive and thus may be said to violate the offender’s right to bodily integrity in a 
way that incarceration does not. However, incarceration plausibly violates other 
important rights such as rights to free movement and association, or at least it would 
had the offender not forfeited these rights, or some aspect of them; as such, in order to 
defend the consent requirement by appealing to the right to bodily integrity, it seems 
that one would need to defend the claim that this right is more robust than rights to 
freedom of movement and association, such that it would take more serious criminal 
offending to forfeit the relevant rights to bodily integrity than to forfeit the relevant 
rights to free movement and association. One of us has recently argued that this claim 
is not as easy to defend as our intuitions might lead us to believe (Douglas, 2014, pp. 
113–118).  
Moreover, it might seem implausible that it is the bodily invasiveness of 
neurocorrectives that explains why, unlike incarceration, they may not permissibly be 
imposed without consent. The primary intended effects of neurocorrectives are mental 
rather than bodily. Indeed, some neurointerventions that might be used as 
neurocorrectives, such as transcranial electric brain stimulation, are only doubtfully or 
minimally physically invasive. It might thus seem more credible that the most 
significant moral difference between incarceration and neurocorrectives is to be 
located in the mental effects of the latter. Perhaps, then, the consistency argument 
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should be resisted not by appealing to a right to bodily integrity, but by appealing to a 
right to mental integrity (Douglas, 2014, pp. 113–118).  
Farah seems to implicitly appeal to this sort of concept in observing that 
neurocorrectives might deny offenders the “. . . freedom to think one’s own thoughts 
and have one’s own personality” (Farah, 2002, p. 1126). However, there has been 
little research regarding whether there is a right to mental integrity, or concerning 
what sorts of mental influences might violate it. Bublitz and Merkel have offered an 
initial exploration of this putative right, suggesting that such a right exists, or is, “as a 
tacit assumption, woven into law’s structure” (Bublitz and Merkel, 2014, p. 60); they 
also argue that nonconsensual interventions into other minds might violate this right if 
they substantially undermine mental self-determination by reducing the victim’s 
mental control, or by exploiting pre-existing mental weaknesses (Bublitz and Merkel, 
2014, p. 68). Whilst Bublitz and Merkel understand the right to mental integrity to 
afford protection against harms to mental life generally, for our purposes, the most 
interesting aspect of the purported right to mental integrity is that it is understood to 
afford protection against interventions that undermine an agent’s mental self-
determination (Bublitz and Merkel, 2014, p. 58). Mental self-determination here is to 
be understood in an interpersonal sense, to refer to the extent to which a person’s 
mental powers are free from the undue influence of others.  
One problem facing advocates of a right to mental integrity is how we should 
cash out the notion of ‘undue influence’ here. After all, we commonly interfere with 
other people’s minds without this being a morally problematic instance of 
undermining their mental self-determination; for instance, when we enter into a 
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rational dialogue with another person, we will often have an effect on their mental 
states. How then, do we distinguish those sorts of interferences that undermine mental 
self-determination and those that do not? Anticipating this problem, Bublitz and 
Merkel claim that there is an important moral difference between interventions that 
operate directly on the brain (such as neuro-interventions of the sort that we are 
considering), and indirect interventions that are perceived sensually and processed by 
psychological mechanisms. The two types of intervention differ morally, they claim, 
because indirect interventions may respect mental self-determination, whilst direct 
interventions circumvent it. They write: 
 
Persons have most control over interventions whose sensual substrates they perceive, 
particularly those rising to the level of conscious awareness. . . Direct interventions, 
by contrast, are qualitatively different, presumably bypassing these psychological 
(not necessarily rational) processes altogether. Roughly one could say that indirect 
interventions are inputs into the cognitive machinery our minds are adapted to 
process, whereas direct interventions change the cognitive machinery itself. (Bublitz 
and Merkel, 2014, pp. 69"cit. 
 
Shaw (2014) has offered an alternative account of the morally relevant 
difference between direct and indirect interventions. She suggests that certain direct 
interventions are problematic because they would serve to objectify offenders by 
rehabilitating them in a manner that fails to engage them in a rational moral 
dialogue.24 She also suggests that permitting the use of neurointerventions in criminal 
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justice would serve to widen the inequality of power between offenders and the state 
(Shaw, 2014, p. 13).25 However, unlike Bublitz and Merkel, Shaw’s account of why 
direct interventions are more morally problematic than indirect interventions does not 
rule out the possibility that some direct interventions might yet be morally 
permissible. Shaw claims that whilst direct interventions are problematic if they serve 
to change the offender’s values in a manner that does not include the offender in a 
moral dialogue, nonconsensual direct interventions may be permissible if they enable 
offenders to engage in a moral dialogue as a part of their rehabilitation. For instance, 
she suggests that permissible interventions might include enhancing an offender’s 
powers of attention, or their ability to delay gratification (Shaw, 2014, pp. 14–15).  
It can be argued, however, that the question of whether the state may 
consistently permit the nonconsensual incarceration of offenders without also 
permitting the nonconsensual use of neurocorrectives remains open. Whilst the 
analyses considered above have laid important foundations for addressing this 
question, there is still a great deal of work to be done in this area; for instance, with 
respect to Bublitz and Merkel’s analysis, one could question whether the fact that an 
indirect intervention engages the recipient’s psychological processes is always 
sufficient for establishing that the intervention respects the recipient’s right to mental 
self-determination. Furthermore, we might also question whether some direct 
interventions might be permissible even if they bypass the offenders psychological 
processes, as Shaw suggests with regards to interventions that serve to enable the 
offender to participate in rational moral dialogue. Of course, there is an important 
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penal theoretic issue underlying both of these questions, namely, the issue of whether 
how important it is for criminal sanctions to respect the offender’s right to mental 
integrity, and whether criminal sanctions should seek to address the offender ‘in a 
rational moral dialogue’.26 Whilst much of the debate regarding the use of non-
consensual neurocorrectives has been grounded in the framework of medical ethics, it 
seems that addressing these penal theoretic questions would add a great deal to the 
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